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The post 1999 devolution project has resulted in a major recalibration of the pre-existing 
arrangements for making European Union policy within the UK.  The devolved administrations 
in Scotland and Wales (but not the English regions) have gained in electoral legitimacy and 
legislative powers, and thereby a greater claim to consultation with UK central government.  
Four key characteristics of EU policy making in a devolved UK are identified. The legal 
contingency of the ‘devolveds’’ status has not yet impeded traditional cooperative relations 
between government tiers, but the stability of the new arrangements remains in question.  The 
UK case is compared to EU regionalisation in other member states and a distinction is drawn 





This paper examines how devolution has impacted upon UK arrangements for handling European 
Union (EU) matters.  In 1997, the new Labour government launched a wide-ranging project for 
constitutional modernisation, with devolution as one of the key features. Under the devolution 
settlement, responsibility for EU matters is reserved to the UK national government.  However, as 
many of the specific policies devolved to the new administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland are significantly affected by EU legislation, the understanding is that they should be drawn 
into the processes for determining the national EU policy on matters of concern to them. Originally, 
the Labour Government had intended the devolution project to be extended to English regions if 
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there was popular support. Consequently, in May 2003, the Regional Assemblies (Preparations) Act 
was passed, paving the way for referendums to be held across England to gauge support for elected 
regional assemblies. In the event, following an unexpected 'no' vote in the first such referendum held 
in the North East of England, plans for English devolution effectively have been shelved. The 
democratisation of these areas is not now expected to take place, at least in the foreseeable future, 
although the administrative structures at regional level will remain and in some cases will be 
augmented. This has resulted in a rather 'untidy' constitutional situation in the UK. While it is clear 
which administrations now speak on behalf of Scotland and Wales, on reserved matters, including 
the UK's EU policy, it is unclear 'who' speaks for England.  
 
These developments in the UK need to be placed in the wider context of European regionalism over 
the last few decades. Indeed the interaction between sub-national authorities (SNAs) and the 
European Union has developed into a significant field of study since the 1980s. By 'interaction' we 
refer, firstly, to the fact that SNAs have had to adapt to the changing configuration of the EU itself. 
However, these changes have in turn led the SNAs to seek new powers within their national political 
system and at EU level in order to ensure their voice is heard within the EU. The field of study is 
generally termed ‘multi-level governance’ and has charted change in the activities of SNAs, driven 
by European integration. According to some analysts, this change has transformed the role of SNAs 
in the EU at the cost of national governments (for instance, see Marks et al, 1996). Yet other 
commentators have argued that the growth in SNA activity does not of itself denote any impact upon 
the primacy of national governments' influence in the EU (Pollack, 1995; Allen, 2000). This 
controversy has reflected a broader debate in EU studies about whether the power within the Union 
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is concentrated on the member state governments or is shared upwards with supranational 
institutions and downwards with SNAs (see Rosamond 2000). 
 
The literature on the relationship between UK devolution and European policy has eschewed this 
discussion. Arguably the key reason for this has been the fact that devolution did not come about as 
a direct result of UK SNAs' dissatisfaction about the impact of the EU upon their powers, but rather 
principally for domestic reasons. In fact, UK SNAs had been significantly involved in EU policy 
before devolution. The focus of this article is the considerable impact devolution has had on these 
pre-existing patterns of involvement. 
 
In his contribution to the literature on SNAs and European integration, Charlie Jeffery has taken 
what we might term a third way between the two polar arguments: of a 'Europe of the regions' on the 
one hand, and a Europe still dominated by national governments, on the other. He has argued that the 
debate has tended to neglect the 'intra-state environment in which SNAs are embedded' (Jeffery, 
2000:3). Further, he argues that there has been a lack of attention to the 'influence-creating channels 
of access to EU policy-making … which exist within Member States' (Jeffery, 2000:3). This position 
is axiomatic in our analysis of how EU policy is made within the devolved UK. We argue that, both 
before and after devolution, it is the channel of access running from the SNAs through the national 
government to the EU that matters, but that dealings within this channel have undergone specific 
changes that promise to alter the relationships between these levels of governance.  
 
Let us spell out the arguments and issues that we will pursue in this paper.  
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First, we argue that the involvement of UK SNAs in EU policy-making sheds important light on the 
devolution settlement itself. The UK as a member state is itself constrained in its policy actions by 
virtue of membership of the European Union (EU) and the legal primacy of agreements reached in 
that arena. Thus in areas such as rural affairs, fisheries or the environment, British policy is 
constrained by EU commitments. Given the pervasive impact of the EU, it is critical to an 
understanding of how devolution works generally to see it in this multi-levelled context. Is there 
actually any scope for distinctive input from UK SNAs in policy areas such as these, and has 
devolution expanded that scope? 
 
Secondly, we believe that there is merit in understanding the interaction of the devolved UK with the 
EU in comparative context. Distinctive though the UK settlement may be, the challenges faced by 
the devolved authorities are common to all SNAs in the EU. The key common feature is that the EU 
has been granted policy responsibilities by the member governments, and these responsibilities are 
subject to change each time the EU treaties are re-negotiated. At the same time some of those 
responsibilities are shared domestically with SNAs: here the UK devolved authorities. These SNAs 
have to give effect to some EU policies and therefore expect to have opportunities to make an input 
into the making of European policy, both through national channels and directly at EU level. 
Comparison can help shed light on the distinctive UK approach to this situation. This issue of 
constraints on SNAs and how to engage them in national EU policy making is of long standing for 
several partner-states in the EU. What devolution brought that was new to the UK was the creation 
of a new tier of elected authorities with the ability to draw on a new source of legitimacy in their 
claims to participate in EU policy.  
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Thirdly, the challenge of SNA participation in EU policy is not unique to the UK. We argue that the 
nature of change following devolution has to be understood both in the context of pre-existing UK 
arrangements and in a wider comparative context. Elsewhere we have argued that devolution 
represented a critical juncture in the handling of European policy within the UK (Bulmer et.al., 
2002, chapter 7). However, when seen in comparative perspective the changes appear less striking. 
This is explained by the fact that the changes are in keeping with distinctive British constitutional 
practice, which is evolutionary, somewhat ad hoc in character and with considerable reliance on 
informal understandings rather than explicit constitutional provision (Street and Brazier, 1985: 26-
30; Turpin, 1995: 87-92). There are attendant risks in this informal approach. In particular, the 
stability of the arrangements might come under threat if the Labour Party's prominence across the 
key tiers of authority were to decline. Hence we shall reflect on the durability of the post-devolution 
arrangements. 
 
Our third argument thus aims to position UK devolution by identifying its distinctive structural and 
behavioural characteristics in terms of debates relating to the involvement of SNAs in other member 
states. The key questions about the involvement of SNAs' in EU policy-making are summed up by 
Jeffery as follows.  
• Are SNAs endowed with constitutionalised status as regards participation in EU policy-
making (Jeffery, 2000: 6)? The distinction made by Jeffery is between situations where participation 
in EU policy-making is provided in the constitution itself and other lesser-order, but nonetheless 
formal, participation arrangements.  
• Do the SNAs emphasise extra-state engagement direct with Brussels rather than intra-state 
engagement with the national government (Jeffery, 2000: 2)?  
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• Do they pursue a competitive, confrontational strategy or a cooperative one (see Börzel, 
1999: 573-96)?  
UK devolution lacks a formally codified, constitutional status, thereby setting it apart from Germany 
or Belgium (for instance, see respectively Jeffery 1997; and Bursens and Helsen, 2001). The 
contingent nature of the relationship between the devolved authorities and the UK government is 
defined and interpreted largely by central government. The former owe their status to statute law 
passed by the Westminster parliament. The lack of formal constitutional status, together with the 
asymmetrical characteristics of UK devolution, would suggest a highly unstable arrangement for 
European policy-making. Combined with local accountability of devolved authorities – to directly 
elected assemblies in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and greater London, to indirectly elected 
ones elsewhere in England – the circumstances would suggest competitive devolution: a situation 
whereby devolved authorities confront or circumvent the UK state. As will be clear in the following 
pages, nothing could be further from the truth.  In legal terms, the UK devolveds’ status is highly 
vulnerable and yet the mode of interaction between government tiers has to date remained resolutely 
cooperative. 
 
Against this backdrop the research question addressed in the paper is: what impact has devolution 
had on the making of EU policy in the UK? Our argument is that there has been a major 
recalibration of the arrangements that held prior to devolution. The recalibration has led to a stronger 
set of arrangements for Scotland and Wales, based upon intra-state engagement with UK 
government. For Northern Ireland there is a potentially stronger set of arrangements but the 
suspension of devolution has meant that they have not yet been operationalised. The English regions' 
involvement is much weaker. These findings derive from two research projects that were based on 
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extensive elite interviewing across the UK. The first project examined the institutional changes 
brought about by devolution and explored them in Scotland, Wales and UK central government 
(Bulmer et. al, 2002). The second project looked at the impact of the institutional changes across the 
UK as a whole in several policy areas – agriculture, fisheries, environmental and regional policy (see 
authors' note for fuller details). 
 
What follows is structured in three sections. First of all we outline the changed framework for UK 
SNAs' access to European policy-making following the devolution settlement. We then explore its 
leading characteristics and consider why EU policy-making in the devolved UK has hitherto defied 
inherent risks of territorial conflict and has been relatively problem-free and cooperative. We then 
look at the robustness and sustainability of present arrangements before concluding. Owing to the 
periodic suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly arrangements most of the analysis in this 
article excludes that case. 
 
ACCESS TO EUROPEAN POLICY MAKING: THE POST DEVOLUTION FRAMEWORK 
Devolution and EU policy making 
Devolution has brought with it a significant challenge to the UK Government's approach to the 
handling of UK EU policy. A commitment was given in the devolution proposals to include the 
devolveds – that is, the Scottish Executive and Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the 
Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive – in the process of formulating the UK position where EU 
proposals touched on a devolved competence.  As EU policy was (and is) an issue of  party political 
sensitivity, involving the devolveds in what could be disputatious internal government discussions 
clearly carried attendant political risks. The approach taken to handling EU policy post-devolution 
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has attempted to minimise these risks by devising procedures that permit the devolveds some scope 
for articulating and pursuing their particular interests, but which do not compromise the 
Government's sole authority to represent a single UK position on all EU issues. The upshot is that 
the devolveds enjoy substantial access to the UK's EU policy-making machinery, at least compared 
to non-constitutionalised regions in other member states and to the English regions.  
 
Prior to devolution to the countries of the UK, the territorial input into UK EU policy making was 
provided by the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Offices of UK government and their 
respective ministers. Although these territorial offices have been retained post devolution, in the 
cases of Scotland and Wales they have fulfilled what is mainly a liaison function and most of their 
staff have been absorbed into the devolved administrations. Consequently the initiative in 
developing, clarifying and pursuing the UK territories' interest in EU proposals has passed to the 
devolveds who have inherited the territorial offices’ considerable experience of handling EU 
policies.  This transfer of functions and staff from the territorial offices has ensured continuity in 
practices and understandings and this has undoubtedly been a vital factor in the success of the post-
devolution arrangements in general. 
 
Clarifying new access arrangements 
The general framework for involving the devolveds in UK central government's EU policy making 
was set out in the course of 1999 and is central to the non-conflictual approach to inter-
administration relations that has developed in the UK since devolution. The key document, the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), elaborated the general principles for inter-administration 
policy coordination and cooperation in '…areas where it is necessary to ensure uniform 
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arrangements between the UK Government and the three devolved administrations…' (ODPM, 
2001). One such area was EU policy, and the MoU incorporated a concordat laying down the means 
for co-ordinating EU policy across the UK.  This included arrangements for the provision of 
information; involvement in the formulation of UK EU policy; attendance at EU Council of 
Ministers and related meetings; implementation of EU obligations; and infraction proceedings (see 
the Concordat on Co-ordination of European Union Policy Issues in Cabinet Office, 1999 and 
ODPM, 2001; also Scott, 2001). Similar provisions for inter-administration consultation and co-
operation were agreed over an extensive range of devolved competencies and not only with respect 
to UK policy towards EU matters. These frameworks were developed largely by civil servants based 
in Whitehall and in the devolving territories.  Given the unitary civil service in Britain, it is not 
surprising that the negotiations reflected the expectation that EU policy coordination under 
devolution would proceed more or less as it had done prior to devolution.  That is, relevant officials 
in the devolveds would continue to engage with counterpart officials in the relevant Whitehall 
department on EU matters in order to represent their specific interests. (Although the unitary civil 
service does not extend to Northern Ireland, here too strong traditions of cooperation support a 
common ethos with the rest of Britain.)  At the political level provision was made in the MoU for the 
creation of a Joint Ministerial Committee on Europe (JMC(E)) which would be used to enable 
ministers to resolve inter-administration disputes over UK EU policy where agreement could not be 
brokered by relevant officials.  
 
The MoU and the attached EU Concordat set out two key principles underlying the UK approach. 
Implicit in both documents is the notion that the relevant administrations would observe a principle 
of 'no surprises'. In the EU policy context this implied that UK government would keep the 
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devolveds closely informed of relevant discussions and debates on EU legislative and policy 
proposals. In exchange, the devolveds would be obliged to observe any degree of confidentiality 
required by UK government with respect to information supplied by it. A second key principle 
underlying the UK approach is its reliance on established Whitehall ways of doing business based on 
sharing information and involvement which are reflected in civil service norms of trust and 
reciprocity. These understandings are fully evident in the concordats and in the ways in which the 
UK EU policy making process has worked under devolution.  
 
The inter-administration arrangements set out in 1999 in the MoU and the Concordat were presented 
as a basic pre-requisite if the UK was to have a coherent and robust policy towards EU legislative 
initiatives. There were two reasons for this. First, devolution transferred primary legislative 
competence to Scotland and Northern Ireland in policy areas over which the EU level of governance 
was also competent to legislate. This raised a possibility that future legislative aims of these 
devolveds might be in conflict with prospective EU legislation. Politically, this could be 
problematic. If UK Government’s view diverged from that of the devolveds, this might serve to 
buttress arguments by nationalist forces favouring independence over devolution. Only by including 
the devolved executives in the UK EU policy process could the Government ensure that the UK 
position took into account Scotland's and Northern Ireland's policy priorities and/or legislative 
ambitions. Extending involvement to Wales was not necessary for this reason, in that the Welsh 
Assembly did not have primary legislative authority. Nevertheless, it was important for a second, 
albeit related, reason: that the devolveds were responsible for the implementation of much EU policy 
within their territories. Thus it was deemed essential to involve the devolveds in the formulation of 
policy on administrative grounds. The aim was to ensure that the UK negotiating position at the EU 
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level reflected a consensus UK position. Otherwise the UK Government risked having its negotiating 
position undermined by one or more of the devolveds publicly criticising domestic policy. The 
position of the English regions was substantially different.  The declared policy of the UK 
Government was that the English regions should not gain privileged access to UK government 
machinery in EU policymaking ahead of the creation of regional assemblies in England. Now that 
devolution to English elected regional assemblies seems unlikely, a broader issue of equity in this 
respect remains unresolved. Understanding this domestic political context in which devolution has 
taken place (and continues to unfold) is central to understanding the arrangements which permit the 
devolveds to contribute to the UK's EU policy processes. It is also key in assessing the robustness of 
current arrangements. 
 
Using channels of access: capacity building in the devolveds, at the centre and in Brussels 
Under the new settlement the key channel of influence for the devolveds' involvement in UK EU 
policy making has been their direct dealings with UK government. The devolveds and Whitehall 
have expanded pre-existing arrangements, but at the same time have had to adapt their respective 
EU-policy capacities to the new situation in ways that have subtly changed the working relationship 
between these two tiers of government.  
 
Prior to devolution, the constituent departments in both territorial offices could fairly be described as 
'branches' of the relevant parent Whitehall department.  However, a central aspect of the internal 
political dynamic of devolution was to enable the devolveds to design policies that reflect distinctive 
territorial interests in devolved competences. Therefore both the Scottish and Welsh administrations 
have prioritised the creation of  new EU policy capacities. This capacity was needed  to coordinate a 
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distinctive territorial view on EU policy; to  represent this to UK Government; and to service the 
(different) demands of the newly established devolved assemblies (Bulmer et al, 2002: 33-102). 
When viewing these developments in broad terms, it is clear that the devolved administrations were 
emerging as potentially powerful centres of influence over UK EU policy in ways that were, 
arguably, disproportionate to their economic, political and social status in the UK as a whole. 
Devolution's subsequent failure to engage the English regions inevitably creates a sense that their 
interests might not be prioritised with the same urgency as the interests of the devolved 
administrations in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast. As already noted this question of the 'voice' of the 
English regions – not to mention England as a whole - when EU policies are being discussed in UK 
Government remains a live and problematic issue.   
 
Devolution also necessitated changes within UK Government. For a transition period devolution 
'desks' or 'units' were created across a range of departments in order to ensure that the commitment 
to include the devolveds in domestic EU policy was honoured. Again, the extent of this new capacity 
varied between departments, as did the novelty of the exercise. In the fields of agricultural policy 
and fisheries policy, for instance, there had been a long-standing interaction between Whitehall 
officials and their counterparts in the devolveds, whereas there was minimal tradition of this in 
relation to environmental policy.   
 
In broad terms the aim of mainstreaming devolution within Whitehall was achieved with little 
apparent difficulty. Two related explanations can be offered for this. First, there was a determination 
at the level of senior officials to make the new arrangements work. A series of Devolution Guidance 
Notes (DGN) was issued by UK government officials on a departmental basis which elaborated the 
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obligations on Whitehall officials to ensure that their counterparts in the devolveds were included in 
the relevant policy information flows, including on EU matters (see DCA 2005).  Moreover, since in 
many cases  relations at the level of officials were long-standing, a good deal of goodwill and 'trust' 
was inherited by the devolveds so as to ensure that the terms of the MoU, especially regarding 
confidentiality of information, would be observed. Secondly, the evidence from the post-devolution 
period is that UK government has been prepared to fully involve ministers from the devolveds in the 
EU policy process where appropriate (i.e. where EU legislative proposals impinged on devolved 
competences). Not only was the JMC(E) created soon after devolution, but a range of ad hoc 
arrangements was established that ensured ministers and officials from the devolveds had access to 
the UK papers on EU issues and also were able to discuss UK EU policy with government ministers 
on an informal basis. These arrangements included the continuation of the practice whereby 
territorial ministers could attend EU Council meetings as part of the UK delegation. Initially the 
more formal channel for engaging the devolveds in EU policy making was centred on MINECOR, 
an inter-administration ministerial committee on EU Policy, which was chaired by the UK’s minister 
for Europe, and to which counterpart ministers from the devolveds were invited. From 2003 it was 
superseded by a re-modelled JMC(E) which now forms the core of this process. To our knowledge it 
has never met, as originally intended, in dispute-resolution mode. Indeed, in recent times the Foreign 
Secretary, Jack Straw, has used the JMC(E) as a forum for widespread information-sharing with the 
devolved authorities in Wales and Scotland, preferring to convene this body rather than the UK 
Cabinet's European policy (EP) committee, from which representatives from the devolveds are 
excluded.   Within the key relationship between the devolveds and UK central government, then, 
there has indeed been a major recalibration of the pre-existing arrangements for making European 
Union policy within the UK; one that has involved a measure of give and take between both parties. 
 15
 
The devolveds' engagement with EU policy processes is not confined to UK government, although 
that remains the primary focus of their efforts. A further channel of influence has been through the 
devolveds’ direct links to Brussels. Post-devolution developments in this relationship appear to have 
been determined very much by the ‘primary’ relationship between the devolveds and UK central 
government.  The devolveds have not attempted to use their Brussels links to by-pass national 
channels, but rather to supplement these without undermining them. Within their relationships with 
Brussels, the devolveds have attempted to co-ordinate Welsh and Scottish members of the European 
Parliament, to lobby interests and institutions at the EU level, to gather information about on-going 
and up-coming business, and to join with other regions in the UK and in other member states in joint 
promotional and lobbying endeavours. For the devolveds the key to doing these things has been 
establishment of representations in Brussels. Prior to devolution there was one formal representation 
of the UK government in Brussels, namely the UK Representation in Brussels, UKRep (on the role 
of this UK 'embassy' to the EU, see Kassim, 2001). After devolution, and as predicted in the 
devolution White Papers, all three devolveds established their own offices in Brussels. However, 
great care was taken to stress that these offices were part of the overall 'family' of the UKRep, rather 
than being independent agencies advocating a specific Scottish, Welsh or Northern Irish view of EU 
legislative proposals. These offices are there to augment UKRep; to support the work of UKRep; to 
focus on issues of particular interest to the devolved executive and perhaps also to engage with the 
EU institutions, but always within the broad framework of a single UK 'voice' in Brussels. Should 
divergent policy interests emerge between UKRep and a Brussels office of a devolved, this conflict 
would be managed 'back home' through established inter-administration procedures. In addition, 
even-handed practices of information sharing that have developed between UKRep and the 
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devolveds’ representations have helped the territorial representations to add considerable value to 
their respective ‘home’ policy resources in those areas that interest them most directly. It is worth 
noting that the English regions also have established offices in Brussels. However they have a 
different function compared to offices of the devolveds, and concentrate solely on raising the profile 
of their regions within the EU institutions and gathering information on specific policies (e.g. 
structural funds) that are directly relevant to local interests. The effectiveness of these offices and the 
way they are organised varies enormously (Burch and Gomez, 2002).  
 
Devolution has also offered the devolveds an opportunity to participate more fully in EU-wide 
coalitions of sub-national governments. Since the entry into force in November 1993 of the Treaty 
on European Union, the UK regions have been represented on the EU Committee of the Regions. 
With devolution, membership of the Committee now draws on the Scottish Parliament, Welsh 
Assembly and Northern Ireland Assembly, as well as on the local authorities. Scotland and Wales 
are also members of the seventy four-region grouping of legislative regions (RegLeg) established in 
2001. This networking of the devolveds into the EU-wide arena may well prove to be an important 
source of informal leverage in the context of EU-wide legislative discussions.  In these ways, then, 
the devolution project has enhanced the legitimacy and potential for proactivity of the UK devolveds 
in processes of EU policymaking.  
 
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF EU POLICY MAKING IN A DEVOLVED UK 
There are four key characteristics of the pattern of arrangements for EU policy making as it has 
emerged in post devolution UK.  
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The first characteristic is its variety. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland each have different 
responsibilities, arrangements and practices for handling European policy.  These are different again 
across and within the English regions. The asymmetries of the devolution settlement are manifest in 
variations in assembly structures and legislative competencies, the nature of access to the European 
policymaking process, and civil service structures.  Moreover, the assemblies and executives are 
endowed with different levels of power; Scotland (and potentially Northern Ireland) having more 
authority than Wales. England, by contrast, has no assembly in its own right.  There can therefore, 
for example, be no separate English scrutiny of EU proposals: this is conflated with UK scrutiny in 
Westminster (on scrutiny more generally, see Bulmer, et. al., 2002, chapter 4, also Carter and 
McLeod, 2004). As in other aspects of devolution, there is an 'English problem'. 
 
A second characteristic is the emergence of a formal framework for multi-level engagement in EU 
policymaking. As far as the devolveds are concerned, devolution has opened up a range of 
opportunities in EU policy making, not all of which existed or were capable of being effectively 
exploited prior to devolution. These opportunities allow the devolveds to engage in shaping UK 
national policy through formal involvement in the processes for forming the UK position and, along 
with UK government, in negotiations in the EU. The devolveds have been proactive in this.  They 
have produced more coherent and territorially focused EU strategies (NAAG 1998; Scottish 
Executive 2004) as well as specific territorial policy evaluations and programmes in particular policy 
fields such as agriculture and rural policy (Scottish Executive, 2002; Welsh Assembly Government, 
2004). Also under devolution they have been better able to galvanise their regions' resources in order 
to take action on European issues.  Shifts in policy outcome remain rather difficult to ascertain, but 
there is already some evidence of a ‘devolution effect’. For example, in the most recent reforms of 
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the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 2003 the option to allow regional variations in the ways 
of calculating new farm based subsidies was chosen by UK ministers and officials because that 
option was in keeping with the spirit and practice of devolution. The same considerations applied to 
the decision to allow variation in the package of environmental and animal welfare incentives that 
accompanies the new subsidy regime (Burch and Gomez, 2004). Another significant devolution 
effect is evident in the relatively generous provision by the UK exchequer of matching funds so as to 
allow the effective take-up of the significant EU structural funds allocated to Wales. In this case 
devolved arrangements allowed for a far more effective lobbying of the UK government than would 
previously have been the case. Of course these may be exceptional cases and the exact trend of 
policy change remains difficult to ascertain for certain in the short, six-year period of devolution's 
operation (Burch et al, 2005: 467-68). 
  
A third characteristic of European policy-making under devolution has been the diversification of 
the policy networks used for handling European policy.  In place of the single exclusive Whitehall 
network that operated prior to 1997, there are now four networks which together govern access to 
information, policy-shaping and decision-making.  These are: the original exclusive Whitehall 
network (which extended to UKRep in Brussels); the increasingly formal network linking Whitehall 
and the devolveds (which in practice often runs largely on bilateral lines, such as in the field of 
environment); a network linking the devolveds to one another; and, finally, a network linking the 
devolveds, their Brussels-based representations and UKRep. As we have noted, in order to influence 
European policy, the key network for the devolveds is the second: that linking Whitehall and the 
devolveds.  This diversification of policy-handling networks has in practice resulted in a greater 
focus on territorial pressures and interests. Moreover, these networks are still evolving.  The network 
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linking the devolveds to one another has not yet been institutionalised to any great extent. It is 
currently characterised by informal consultations, often conducted by telephone or email at a 
'functional' level, between individual officials and their policy counterparts in other devolved 
authorities. In the area of agriculture and rural policy, officials and sometimes ministers seek to meet 
on an annual or bi-annual basis to discuss matters of mutual concern. In future more routine or 
institutionalised forms of cooperation seem likely to evolve (Hogwood, 2004a). Notably, 
emphasising again the asymmetry of the settlement, the English regions remain outside all of these 
networks. 
 
The fourth characteristic is that the devolveds' involvement in EU policy making is conditional and 
dependent. A critical point is that the new and enhanced opportunities noted above need to be 
exploited skilfully so as to ensure that galvanising and pursuing Scotland's or Wales's interests, on 
the one hand, does not jeopardise Scottish or Welsh involvement in the process of shaping the UK 
position on the other. In order to assert themselves successfully in shaping the UK's European 
policy, the devolveds need to balance their policy interests with the rules of engagement imposed on 
them by the prevalent Whitehall culture.  This tricky balancing act is right at the heart of the task of 
conducting European policy making under devolution and it centres on the special relationship with 
Whitehall (Burch, 2004). Compared to the English regions and non-constitutionalised regions in 
other member states, the devolveds enjoy a privileged position in national EU policy making. They 
are treated as partners with UK government. They are not, however, equal partners. They lack the 
constitutional guarantees, the resources, the direct links to EU information sources, and the authority 
that UK central government enjoys in European business.  The devolveds are in effect dependent 
partners in that they rely on the willingness of central government to continue to engage them in the 
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process of UK EU policy making. The relationship with Whitehall is, therefore, a special one but it 
is also highly conditional. It depends on good-will on both sides, on keeping within traditional 
Whitehall understandings about the way in which European business should be handled, and it relies 
heavily on the shared values and understandings of reciprocity and trust which are part of the ethos 
of the British civil service. If the devolveds engage in a conflictual manner with UK central 
government, they risk losing access.   
 
A ROBUST AND ENDURING ARRANGEMENT? 
How well has the key relationship with Whitehall worked so far? Interviews suggest that Whitehall 
is generally becoming more aware of the territorial differences and needs represented by the 
devolveds.  In most cases, Whitehall has made a genuine effort to respect the spirit of the devolution 
settlement.  In practice, though, there are substantial variations in the devolveds' access to EU policy 
consultations across policy areas and departments. In some areas the devolveds have not always 
been kept fully informed or engaged; whereas in others, for example agriculture, they have been 
fully integrated into departmental processes.   On occasions the Whitehall network has deliberately 
operated exclusively of the devolveds especially on EU matters concerning spending questions. At 
other times, though, exclusion appears to have been inadvertent. In some policy areas, the devolveds 
report a perceived hierarchy amongst themselves.  In environmental matters, for example, it is 
commonly felt that Scotland is the most likely to have its voice heard in Whitehall, followed by 
Wales and then Northern Ireland.  In this case, the disparities are accounted for by variations in 
resources amongst the devolveds, together with the fact that Northern Ireland is dealing with a 
backlog of infractions relating to EU environmental legislation.  Whereas Scotland can currently 
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devote resources to preparing and negotiating a number of issues simultaneously with Whitehall, 
Wales must engage more selectively and serially, and Northern Ireland hardly at all. 
 
In contrast to the devolveds, the English regions still struggle to remind many Whitehall departments 
of their existence and their role.  English interests are paradoxically both underrepresented and 
overrepresented in terms of access arrangements.  The English regions, lacking access to the formal 
processes of UK/EU policy making, must use the lobbying tactics of the outsider if they are to make 
their voices heard.  All nine regions (including London) have now developed European strategies on 
which to base engagement with Whitehall over Europe (Gomez and Burch, 2002).  However, the 
English regional networks lobbying into UK-EU policy making are in the process of emerging rather 
than, as yet, fully established. The extent to which they are exploited varies considerably from region 
to region.  On the other hand, some ministries in London have overwhelmingly 'English' 
responsibilities even though they are part of the UK government; the Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister being a particular case in point. In this sense there are also English 'insiders', but, since they 
are not explicitly territorial representatives, it is unclear what aspect of English interest these London 
ministries represent. Moreover as the English regional stance on most European issues is often 
unclear and not systematically drawn into central government, it tends to be generated in central 
government. There is some exception to this in relation to structural funds (EU regional development 
aid) where English regional input on matters concerning their implementation is significant. 
However, the formulation of the UK position on structural funds more generally and the negotiation 
of that position in the EU are processes dominated by central government.    
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There are a number of reasons why the devolved-Whitehall relationship has worked well to date.  
However, some of these serve as a clear indication that the relationship may not always be so 
harmonious.  There are two main threats to the endurance of the current arrangements: the 
momentum for institutional change set in process by the launch of the devolution project, and the 
aspirations of the devolveds' political elites. 
 
First, in addition to the instrumental reasons for compliant behaviour noted above, it is generally 
recognised amongst the devolveds that Whitehall's traditional approach to the formulation and 
representation of a UK line on EU policy has served the UK well and should be maintained (Bulmer 
et al, 2002: 64).  The strength of civil service traditions can be seen, for example, in the current 
practice of low-key administrative resolution of difficulties wherever possible.  It tends to be seen as 
a failure if a policy co-ordination problem must be passed up to ministers rather than resolved at 
official level. The original crisis-resolution function of the JMC(E) has been eschewed. The 
arrangements work to minimise overt political conflict in the resolution of territorial disputes. While 
this is recognised by all participants to serve the needs of efficient policy formulation, it could be 
argued that it simultaneously undermines the representative function of the devolveds in depriving 
them of a public platform on which to air grievances. In future, territorial governments may be less 
content to proceed in this way.   
 
Another reason for the success of the arrangements to date is the cohesion lent to the relationship by 
the electoral coincidence of cross-territorial Labour party dominance of legislative bodies throughout 
the UK since devolution was introduced.  If subsequent elections were to cast up variable majorities, 
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it is uncertain whether relations conducted through the current channels - largely of officials - would 
remain as cordial as they have been to date. 
 
A further conditioning factor has been the extent to which the devolution settlement has built on 
established traditions of territorial administration. The asymmetric model of devolution introduced in 
the UK initially fostered acceptance for the project because it reflected long-standing differences in 
the bilateral relationships forged between each of the 'nations of the union' and UK central 
government.  However, it must be questioned whether such an unequal arrangement can be 
sustained.  Various cases could be made for under-representation within the system.  For example, 
Wales has already conducted an internal investigation of its settlement, which currently restricts the 
Assembly to powers of secondary legislation (National Assembly for Wales, 2004: Wales Office, 
2005).  It is possible that a de-stabilising 'English problem' may arise from England's formal 
exclusion from the settlement, particularly now that the original proposals for elected English 
regional assemblies are on hold.   
 
In this context, it should be recognised that the devolveds are still in the process of discovering the 
potential of their new role.  Executive and legislative devolution involves the devolveds in aspects of 
policy participation and legislation that did not feature in their previous role in administrative 
decentralisation.  As they grow in confidence, a conscious withdrawal from a subservient 
relationship with Whitehall – as long as the public support for such a move is in place - might appear 
worth the risk.   
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So how robust and sustainable are the arrangements for devolved access to EU decision-making? 
The long-term prospects for the devolved approach to UK European policy making is dependent on 
it becoming sufficiently embedded ahead of the inevitable situation where party politics are more 
diverse than at present. A gradual erosion of those values and understandings underpinning the 
operation of a unified UK civil service could also prove problematic. We have found that as the 
devolveds develop their own institutional integrity, despite the continued formal existence of a 
unified civil service, the socialising effect of Whitehall is proving more distant. And as the 
devolveds' recruitment patterns draw more heavily on home-based personnel a shift in perceptions 
and loyalties seems likely to become more evident (Parry, 2003). Clearly, as the relationship is 
dependent and conditional, the attitude of Whitehall to regional flexibility in the nature and 
application of EU policy is a key issue. Indeed there are signs that Whitehall is gradually taking a 
more relaxed stance on this, though this is truer in the case of some Departments than others. There 
is also an emerging trend within the EU for regional flexibility to be built into policy proposals. This 
scope for different applications of policy within a member state's territory could remove the potential 
for future conflict between the regional and the national tier. Though again much depends on the 
extent to which UK central government wishes to buy into such opportunities for variation and the 
extent to which the devolveds are able to persuade them to do so.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Our survey reveals that devolution is opening up new opportunities for regional actors even in a 
highly constrained area such as European policy making. This provides some indication of the 
significance of the changes that devolution is bringing about more widely. The structure of policy 
making has altered to allow a more territorially focused input to take place. The impact on policy 
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outcomes, however, is less clear-cut.  In the UK, the key channel for exercising influence on the part 
of the SNAs is that linking the devolveds with central government. The effect of devolution has been 
to maintain and augment this channel and to create new channels and networks amongst the 
devolveds themselves and to UKRep in Brussels. These latter are in the process of emerging and the 
national channel remains by a long measure the most significant. Access to it conveys a special and 
rather privileged status. 
 
There is, however, a very clear distinction to be drawn between the devolveds and the English 
regions. The former have insider access to national EU policy making. This can be contrasted with 
the outsider status of the English regions. These differences in position and potential require quite 
distinct strategies for engaging in European policy making. For the devolveds the key strategic 
challenge is how to stay inside the system while developing a more specific territorial stance. For the 
English regions the key challenge is to be heard at all. There is also the tricky question as to who 
actually can represent an English position – the UK authorities in London or the amalgam of bodies 
and groupings that come together to discuss European issues at regional level.  
 
If we return to the points on the comparative features of regional engagement in the EU outlined in 
the introduction, we can conclude that the intersection between UK devolution and the EU is 
characterised by: a) its non-constitutionalised status; b) an emphasis upon intra-state channels; and c) 
a cooperative strategy (Scotland and Wales) or a consultative one (the English regions). Given these 
characteristics, the devolveds' involvement in European policy making can best be summarised as a 
type of 'co-operative regionalism' allowing them insider participation in national policy making. In 
the case of the English regions we have a highly restricted form of 'consultative regionalism' with 
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limited involvement on a few key issues – notably the structural funds - and much dependence on 
outsider lobbying. 
 
Viewed in comparison with other EU member states, the unique character of ‘co-operative 
regionalism’ in the UK can be seen to have both advantages and disadvantages. Its non-
constitutionalised status could prove problematic in a situation where territorial conflicts – 
particularly those between periphery and central state - cannot be contained within civil service 
channels.  In Spain, for example, the formal constitution has served to frame the limits of the 
contingency relationship between the central state and the ‘autonomous communities’ and they have 
been able to appeal to the Constitutional Court in order to clarify such matters.   In the UK, no forum 
of conflict resolution is available to the devolveds separate from the machinery of central 
government (Hogwood, 2004b).  Moreover, the constitutional entrenchment of territorial 
relationships in other member states has arguably promoted an expansion over time of the sub-state 
tier with respect to EU policy making (Hogwood and Gomez, 2004). Particularly in the federal states 
of Germany and Belgium, the substantial exclusive and shared competencies enjoyed by the Länder 
(Germany) and regions and communities (Belgium) puts them in a powerful position to influence 
European policy.   Such a degree of involvement is not guaranteed to the UK devolveds.  At the 
same time, though, the informal character of the devolveds’ non-constitutionalised status, together 
with the ease and openness of access between levels of government plus a common horror of 
politicising policy conflicts, have promoted a highly cooperative approach to problem solving. An 
approach not commonly found in systems with more formal access arrangements such as in 
Germany or Spain.   
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Overall on ‘co-operative regionalism’, our findings do not fully support the intergovernmentalists’ 
continued confidence in the dominance of national level decision-makers in EU policy-making.  
Neither do they fully uphold the implication of writings within multi-level governance that any 
enhancement of the role of SNAs will automatically come at a cost to the role of the national level in 
the EU arena. For the time being, the devolveds and UK government alike have chosen to adopt a 
cooperative approach to EU policy making in order to minimise open political conflict and to 
maximise their ability to forge a common UK position to take to Council.  Both the success of the 
UK arrangements to date and their inherent structural, constitutional and electoral vulnerability 
demonstrates the relevance of Jeffery’s focus on the ‘intra-state environment in which SNAs are 
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